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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 A. Factual History 
 Appellant Ronald Goepel is a civilian employee of the 
United States Department of the Navy.  He and his wife, appellant 
Marilyn Goepel, reside in Deptford, New Jersey, and have been 
enrolled in the Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, a fee-for-service 
health benefits plan, continuously since 1981.  The Mail Handlers 
Benefit Plan is one of the health insurance plans available to 
federal government employees and their families.  These 
healthcare plans are established pursuant to the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), 5 U.S.C. § 8901 et seq., 
which authorizes the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to 
contract with carriers to provide health benefits plans to 
federal employees and their families.   
 OPM has contracted with the appellee, the National 
Postal Mail Handlers Union, a division of the Laborers 
International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, for the provision 
of the Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, and the Union has 
subcontracted with Continental Assurance Company to underwrite 
 
 
and administer the Plan.  Each year OPM and the Union negotiate 
the terms of the Plan and document these terms in the Plan 
brochure, which is included as an appendix to the contract 
between OPM and the Union. 
 In January 1993, Marilyn Goepel learned that she had 
metastatic breast cancer.  Thereafter, her consulting oncologist, 
Dr. David L. Topolsky of Hahnemann University, recommended that 
she undergo a treatment in which high doses of chemotherapy are 
followed by a peripheral stem cell infusion (HDC/APCR).1  On July 
14, 1993, Dr. Topolsky wrote to the Plan requesting a 
determination of whether this treatment would be covered.  
Subsequently, on August 5, 1993, one of the Plan's customer 
service representatives stated in a telephone conversation that 
the treatment would not be covered, and indicated that it would 
take four to six weeks for Marilyn Goepel to receive an official 
notice of the Plan's denial of coverage in the mail.   
 The Goepels contacted Congressman Robert E. Andrews, 
who then sent a letter dated August 6, 1993, to OPM on their 
behalf.  Within a week, OPM responded to Congressman Andrews' 
                     
1.  In a certification dated August 17, 1993, Dr. Topolsky 
explained the treatment as follows: it "works on the principal 
[sic] that the high doses of chemotherapy required to 
substantially kill or eradicate a patient's tumor will, as a 
side-effect, fatally destroy the patient's bone marrow.  
Therefore, a sample of either bone marrow or bone marrow cells 
which have been induced to enter the peripheral blood, are 
removed and stored in a freezer prior to the high-dose 
chemotherapy process.  Following administration of the 
chemotherapy to the patient, the previously stored marrow cells 
are given back to the patient to protect them from an otherwise 
fatal toxic-side-effect of the treatment."  See app. at 94. 
 
 
inquiry with a letter stating that page 19 of the 1993 Plan 
brochure "explicitly excludes benefits for HDCT/ABMT for breast 
cancer," and that therefore OPM had "no contractual basis to ask 
the Plan to provide benefits for Mrs. Goepel."2  See app. at 445.  
The Plan also sent a letter dated August 10, 1993, to Dr. 
Topolsky, denying his request for pre-authorization of benefits 
for HDC/APCR for Mrs. Goepel on the grounds that the terms of the 
1993 Plan brochure did not cover the use of HDC/APCR for the 
treatment of breast cancer.  The Goepels did not appeal the 
Plan's denial of coverage to OPM.  However, the parties have 
stipulated that "[i]f plaintiffs were required to exhaust any 
right they had to seek review by OPM[,] . . . that exhaustion 
requirement was satisfied" by Congressman Andrews' letter to the 
OPM on Mrs. Goepel's behalf and OPM's response to that letter.  
See app. at 26.    
  
 B. Procedural History 
 On August 19, 1993, the Goepels filed a complaint in 
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, alleging that:  
(1) the Plan violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1 et seq. (West 1993); (2) the Plan 
breached its contract by refusing to certify her coverage for 
HDC/APCR; (3) any exclusion of coverage for HDC/APCR in the Plan 
                     
2.  In its letter the OPM referred to the coverage sought as 
"high dosage chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow transplant 
(HDCT/ABMT)."  In view of our result we need not discuss the 




brochure was unconscionable; and (4) the Plan's handling of Mrs. 
Goepel's claim involved unfair claim settlement practices in 
violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:30-13.1 (West 1985).  See app. 
at 1-10.  On these bases, the Goepels sought a declaratory 
judgment, injunctive relief, damages, and counsel fees.  Id.   
 The Plan immediately removed the case to the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  In its 
notice of removal, the Plan stated that the case was removable 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and (c), because the Goepels' 
breach of contract claim "arises under the laws of the United 
States," and their other state law claims were "inextricably 
intertwined" with the breach of contract claim.  Subsequently, 
the Goepels filed a motion to remand the case to the state court 
on the grounds that their breach of contract claim did not raise 
a federal question, as it was merely a private contractual 
dispute between an insured and a health care insurer.  However, 
the district court denied the motion to remand.  See Goepel v. 
Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, No. 93-3711 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1993).  
Subsequently, the district court tried the case on the merits 
pursuant to a joint stipulation of the facts, and entered 
judgment in favor of the Plan on all counts of the complaint.  
See Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, No. 93-3711 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 24, 1993).     
 
 II. DISCUSSION 
 In denying the Goepels' motion to remand this case to 
New Jersey Superior Court, the district court held that the case 
 
 
was removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) because "the matter 
[wa]s one 'arising under' the laws of the United States."  See 
Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, No. 93-3711, at 2 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 10, 1993).  Section 1441(b) provides in relevant part that 
 [a]ny civil action of which the district 
courts have original jurisdiction founded on 
a claim or right arising under the 
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United 
States shall be removable without regard to 
the citizenship or residence of the parties. 
The Goepels argue that the Plan improperly removed the case 
because they base their claims exclusively on state law, and thus 
do not raise any "federal questions" over which the district 
court would have original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).  
We confine our review of the district court's subject matter 
jurisdiction to whether it had federal question removal 
jurisdiction over the Goepels' claims, as the Plan removed the 
case to district court on this basis alone, and it does not 
contend that it could have removed the case on the basis of 
diversity of citizenship.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(a); 
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 
2429 (1987) ("Absent diversity of citizenship, federal-question 
jurisdiction is required [for removal]."). 
 "'[F]ederal question' cases . . . [are] those cases 
'arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.'"  Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 
107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546 (1987) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331).  "The 
presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed 
 
 
by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal 
question jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 
presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded 
complaint."  Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 
S.Ct. at 2429 (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 
112-13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97-98 (1936)).  "'The rule makes the 
plaintiff the master of the claim,'" as generally "'he or she may 
avoid federal jurisdiction'" by drafting a complaint which relies 
exclusively on state law.  Krashna v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 895 
F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. 
Williams, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. at 2429). 
 The Goepels' complaint does not purport to rely on 
federal law.  Two of their its claims, namely the claims alleging 
violations of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 10:5-1 et seq., and New Jersey's law against unfair claim 
settlement practices, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:30-13.1, are based 
expressly on New Jersey statutes.  See app. at 1-4, 8-10.  
Moreover, although the Goepels' breach of contract and 
unconscionability claims do not rely expressly on either state or 
federal law, in the absence of any indication that the Goepels 
intended to invoke federal common law, we conclude that "on their 
face" these claims are grounded exclusively on New Jersey common 
law.3   
                     
3.  We do not reach the question of whether the Goepels could 
have stated a cause of action under federal common law. 
 
 
 Nevertheless, the Plan argues that the Goepels' 
complaint "raises a federal question on its face" because it 
"seeks to enforce rights under a contract made by OPM pursuant to 
authority conferred by FEHBA," and "construction of that federal 
contract is governed exclusively by federal law."  See br. at 32.  
Although the nature of the contract that the Goepels are seeking 
to enforce ultimately may lead a court to find that their state 
claims are preempted, their complaint does not "raise a federal 
question on its face" merely by virtue of the fact that it 
alludes to a federal contract.4  Thus, if the "well-pleaded 
complaint rule" were an unqualified bar to federal question 
jurisdiction, our analysis would end here, as on its face the 
Goepels' complaint does not raise a federal question.  However, 
as we recognized in United Jersey Banks v. Parell, 783 F.2d 360, 
366 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170, 106 S.Ct. 2892 
(1986), "the issue is not as straightforward as the black letter 
law appears." 
 In Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2841 (1983), the Supreme Court 
"referred to two situations where federal jurisdiction could be 
available even though plaintiff based its claim in state court on 
state law: (1) when 'it appears that some substantial, disputed 
question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the 
                     
4.  See Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 
152-54 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a complaint's reference to 
federal environmental statutes as the basis for a claim alleging 
negligence per se did not suffice to state a claim arising under 
federal law).  
 
 
well-pleaded state claims' or (2) when it appears that 
plaintiff's claim 'is "really" one of federal law.'"  United 
Jersey Banks v. Parell, 783 F.2d at 366 (quoting Franchise Tax 
Bd., 463 U.S. at 13, 103 S.Ct. at 2848).  Subsequently, in United 
Jersey Banks v. Parell, we concluded that "[c]areful examination 
of the framework of the Court's analysis of the 'substantial, 
disputed question of federal law' issue" in Franchise Tax Bd. 
"manifests that the Court was not enunciating a new basis for 
federal jurisdiction but instead was reaffirming the traditional 
well-pleaded complaint test."  Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 
U.S. at 13-22, 103 S.Ct. at 2848-53).  Accordingly, unless we 
determine that one of the Goepels' state claims "is 'really' one 
of federal law," Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13, 103 S.Ct. at 
2848, removal of the case to the district court was improper, and 
we must order it remanded to the New Jersey Superior Court. 
 A state claim which is "really one of federal law" may 
be removed to federal court because "it is an independent 
corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff may 
not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal 
questions in a complaint."  Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 22, 
103 S.Ct. at 2853.  The Supreme Court has held that a state cause 
of action is "really" a federal cause of action which may be 
removed to federal court if the "federal cause of action 
completely preempts . . . [the] state cause of action."  
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24, 103 S.Ct. at 2854.  This 
principle is "known as the 'complete preemption' doctrine," 
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. at 
 
 
2430, and it is "a distinct concept from ordinary preemption," 
Railway Labor Excecutives Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. Co., 
858 F.2d 936, 941 (3d Cir. 1988).5  Thus, "'[t]he fact that a 
defendant might ultimately prove that a plaintiff's claims are 
pre-empted . . . does not establish that they are removable to 
federal court.'"  Id. (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 
U.S. at 398, 107 S.Ct. at 2432).6 
 As we stated in Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. 
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. Co., 858 F.2d at 939, 
 [t]he complete preemption doctrine holds that 
'Congress may so completely preempt a 
particular area, that any civil complaint 
raising this select group of claims is 
necessarily federal in character.'  
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 
U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 
(1987).  In such cases, 'any complaint that 
comes within the scope of the federal cause 
                     
5.  "This same principle has been referred to elsewhere as the 
'artful pleading' doctrine, under which a court will not allow a 
plaintiff to deny a defendant a federal forum when the 
plaintiff's complaint contains a federal claim 'artfully pled' as 
a state law claim."  United Jersey Banks v. Parell, 783 F.2d at  
367 (citations omitted).  See also Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. 
v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2427 n.2 (1981) 
("As one treatise puts it, courts 'will not permit plaintiff to 
use artful pleading to close off defendant's right to a federal 
forum . . . [and] occasionally the removal court will seek to 
determine whether the real nature of the claim is federal, 
regardless of plaintiff's characterization") (quoting 14 C. 
Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 
3722 at 564-66 (1976) (citations omitted)). 
6.  "[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to 
federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the 
defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the 
plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties concede that the 
federal defense is the only question truly at issue."  
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. at 2430 
(citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12, 103 S.Ct. at 2847-48). 
 
 
of action [created by the federal statute] 
necessarily "arises under" federal law,' 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers 
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 
2841, 2854 (1983), for purposes of removal 
based on federal question jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court has held that both the Labor Management 
Relations Act (LMRA), and the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) "completely preempt" certain state causes of action.  
The Supreme Court first applied the complete preemption doctrine 
in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235 
(1968), holding that Section 301 of LMRA "is so powerful as to 
displace entirely any state cause of action 'for violation of 
contracts between an employer and a labor organization.'"  
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23, 103 S.Ct. at 2853 (citing Avco 
Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 376 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1967), 
aff'd, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235).  Later, in Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63-67, 107 S.Ct. at 1546-48, the 
Supreme Court held that ERISA completely preempted the common law 
contract and tort claims brought by an ERISA plan beneficiary 
asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under the 
plan.  However, in Franchise Tax Bd., an earlier case, the 
Supreme Court held that ERISA did not completely preempt "a suit 
by state tax authorities both to enforce . . . levies against 
funds held in trust pursuant to an ERISA-covered employee benefit 
plan, and to declare the validity of the levies notwithstanding 
ERISA."  Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 28, 103 S.Ct. at 2856.  
 The Court in Franchise Tax Bd. based its determination 
that ERISA did not preempt a state law action by state tax 
 
 
authorities seeking to enforce a tax levy against an ERISA plan 
in part on the fact that ERISA "d[id] not provide an alternative 
cause of action in favor of the State to enforce its rights."  
Id. at 26, 103 S.Ct. at 2855.  In contrast, section 301 of LMRA 
"expressly supplied the plaintiff in Avco with a federal cause of 
action to replace its pre-empted state contract claim," id., and 
section 502(a) of ERISA expressly supplied the plaintiff in 
Metropolitan with a federal cause of action to replace his 
preempted state contract and tort claims, Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65, 107 S.Ct. at 1547.  Based on this 
distinction between Franchise Tax Bd., on the one hand, and Avco 
and Metropolitan, on the other hand, we have held that the 
complete preemption doctrine applies only if "the statute relied 
upon by the defendant as preemptive contains civil enforcement 
provisions within the scope of which the plaintiff's state claim 
falls."  Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942 (citing Franchise Tax 
Bd., 463 U.S. at 24, 26, 103 S.Ct. at 2854-55).  We also have 
identified a second prerequisite for the application of the 
complete preemption doctrine: "a clear indication of a 
Congressional intention to permit removal despite the plaintiff's 
exclusive reliance on state law."  Id. (citing Metropolitan Life, 
481 U.S. at 64-66, 107 S.Ct. at 1547-48).   
 Thus, based on our construction of Franchise Tax Bd., 
"[t]he doctrine of complete preemption applies only when [these] 
two circumstances are present."  Allstate Ins. Co. v. The 65 
Security Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1989).  See also Krashna 
v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 895 F.2d at 114 (applying the two factors 
 
 
identified in Railway and Allstate as prerequisites for the 
application of the complete preemption doctrine).  We also have 
held that the only state claims that are "really" federal claims 
and thus removable to federal court, Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 
at 13, 103 S.Ct. at 2848, are those that are preempted completely 
by federal law.  Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942 ("If the federal 
statute creates no federal cause of action vindicating the same 
interest the plaintiff's state cause of action seeks to 
vindicate, recharacterization as a federal claim is not possible 
and there is no claim arising under federal law to be removed and 
litigated in the federal court.") (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 
U.S. at 24, 26, 103 S.Ct. at 2854-55) (footnote omitted).         
 Without applying the two-part test for complete 
preemption, which we have recognized as the only basis for 
recharacterizing a state law claim as a federal claim removable 
to a district court, the district court concluded that the 
removal was proper because the Goepels' complaint was 
"'necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly 
manifested intent of Congress.'"  Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit 
Plan, No. 93-3711, at 10 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1993) (quoting 
Metropolitan, 481 U.S. at 67, 107 S.Ct at 1548).  The district 
court cited FEHBA's language, its legislative history, and its 
resemblance to ERISA as evidence of Congress's intent to displace 
state law. 
 With respect to preemption, FEHBA states that 
 [t]he provisions of any contract under this 
chapter which relate to the nature or extent 
of coverage or benefits (including payments 
 
 
with respect to benefits) shall supersede and 
preempt any State or local law, or any 
regulation issued thereunder, which relates 
to health insurance or plans to the extent 
that such law or regulation is inconsistent 
with such contractual provisions. 
5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1).  In some respects this provision does 
resemble ERISA's preemption provision, which states that 
"[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the 
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter 
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to an employee benefit plan."  29 U.S.C. § 
1144(a).7  Moreover, the district court noted that: "the 
legislative history [of FEHBA] makes it clear that its intent was 
to 'ensure that benefits and coverage under the program . . . 
[would] be uniform.'"  Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, No. 
93-3711, at 6 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1993) (quoting S. Rept. No. 903, 
95th Cong. 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 
1417). 
 However, ERISA contains a civil enforcement provision 
expressly authorizing ERISA beneficiaries to bring actions to 
recover benefits under an ERISA plan.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).  
                     
7.  There is, of course, a distinction between the preemption 
provisions of ERISA and FEHBA.  The former preempts "any and all 
state laws" having anything to do with employee benefit plans; 
the latter preempts state law relating to FEHBA health insurance 
or plans only "to the extent that such law . . . is inconsistent 
with [a] contractual provision[]" of an FEHBA policy.  ERISA thus 
preempts all state law in a particular area.  Under the FEHBA, 
however, there is no preemption, even in the area of FEHBA health 
insurance and plans, unless there is a conflict between the 
particular state law being relied upon in the litigation and a 
specific contractual provision in an FEHBA policy. 
 
 
In contrast, FEHBA does not create a cause of action vindicating 
a beneficiary's interest in recovering his or her benefits under 
a plan.  FEHBA only provides that "[t]he district courts of the 
United States have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the 
United States Claims Court, of a civil action or claim against 
the United States founded on this chapter."  5 U.S.C. § 8912.  
But the United States is not a party to this action.  Moreover, 
the regulations promulgated by OPM pursuant to FEHBA expressly 
provide that "[a]n action to recover on a claim for health 
benefits should be brought against the carrier of the health 
benefits plan."  See 5 C.F.R. § 890.107.8  Although an enrollee 
"may ask OPM to review" a carrier's decision to deny a claim 
filed under a FEHBA plan, see 5 C.F.R. § 890.105(a), "an 
enrollee's dispute of an OPM decision solely because it concurs 
in a health plan carrier's denial of a claim is not a challenge 
to the legality of OPM's decision," and "[t]herefore, any 
subsequent litigation to recover on the claim should be brought 
against the carrier, not against OPM,"  see 5 C.F.R. § 890.107.9  
 Based on the language of FEHBA and the regulations 
promulgated pursuant to it, it is clear that FEHBA does not 
                     
8.  Congress authorized OPM to "prescribe regulations necessary 
to carry out" the provisions of FEHBA.  5 U.S.C. § 8913(a).   
9.  "Under a well settled principle of deference, 'considerable 
weight should be accorded to an executive department's 
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer.'"  Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1069 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984)), 
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 902 (1994). 
 
 
create a statutory cause of action vindicating the same interest 
that the Goepels' state causes of action seek to vindicate, 
namely the recovery of benefits from the Plan.10  Consequently, 
we conclude that the complete preemption doctrine does not apply 
to the Goepels' claims, and thus "recharacterization" of their 
state claims as federal claims is "not possible" and "there is no 
claim arising under federal law to be removed and litigated in 
the federal court."  Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942 (citing 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24, 26, 103 S.Ct. at 2854-55). 
 We recognize that our decision is at odds with the 
decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
Caudill v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, 999 F.2d 
74 (4th Cir. 1993).  Like this case, Caudill involved a breach of 
contract claim brought in state court by a FEHBA plan enrollee 
seeking to recover benefits from her insurer.  Caudill, 999 F.2d 
at 76-77.  The insurer removed the case to the district court on 
the ground that plaintiff's claim "arose under" federal law, and 
the district court denied the enrollee's motion to remand.  Id. 
at 77.  Subsequently, on appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the removal was proper.  
                     
10.  "There is currently a split of authority with respect to the 
exhaustion requirements for plans governed by FEHBA."  Kennedy v. 
Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 989 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 
1993).  We need not reach the question of whether a plaintiff 
must seek OPM review of the denial of a benefits claim prior to 
filing suit to recover benefits under a FEHBA plan or whether OPM 
review is optional, because in our opinion, even mandatory OPM 
review would not constitute a statutory federal cause of action 




Id. at 79.  According to the court in Caudill, "[i]n the area of 
federal employee health benefits, federal common law entirely 
replaces state contract law," and "[t]herefore, federal 
jurisdiction existed over th[e] claim and removal was proper."  
Id.  The Caudill court based its decision not on the complete 
preemption doctrine, but on Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 
500, 504, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 2514 (1988), a case which the district 
court in this case cited as an alternative basis for its denial 
of the Goepels' motion to remand.11  See Caudill, 999 F.2d at 77; 
Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, No. 93-3711, at 10 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 10, 1993). 
 Boyle was a tort action brought by the father of a 
United States marine killed in a helicopter crash during a 
training exercise.  Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502-03, 108 S.Ct. at 2513.  
The plaintiff alleged that the helicopter manufacturer was liable 
under Virginia tort law because the defective repair and design 
of the craft had caused the accident.  Id. at 503, 108 S.Ct. at 
2513.  The jury returned a general verdict in the plaintiff's 
favor, however, the court of appeals reversed, partially because 
it concluded that federal law immunized the helicopter 
manufacturer from state tort liability based on the allegedly 
defective design of the helicopter.  Id. at 503, 108 S.Ct. at 
2513-14.   
                     
11.  The Caudill court concluded that in light of its holding, it 
"need not answer the question whether the FEHBA completely 
preempts state law claims under federal health insurance 
contracts."  Caudill, 999 F.2d at 77. 
 
 
 The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' 
determination that in the circumstances in Boyle, federal law 
displaced the "state law which holds Government contractors 
liable for design defects in military equipment."  Id. at 512, 
108 S.Ct. at 2518.  The Court based this holding on two grounds: 
(1) that "the procurement of equipment by the United States is an 
area of uniquely federal interest," id. at 507, 108 S.Ct. at 
2516, and (2) that in the circumstances in Boyle, there was a 
"'significant conflict' . . . between an identifiable 'federal 
policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,'"  id. 
(quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68, 
86 S.Ct. 1301, 1304 (1966)).   
 The Court concluded that "the civil liabilities arising 
out of the performance of federal procurement contracts" involve 
a "uniquely federal interest," id. at 505-06, 108 S.Ct. at 2515, 
because "[t]he imposition of liability on Government contractors 
will directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either 
the contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified 
by the Government, or it will raise its price," id. at 507, 108 
S.Ct. at 2515-16.  Moreover, the court concluded that in some 
circumstances, state laws holding government contractors liable 
for design defects "present[ed] a 'significant conflict' with 
[the] federal policy," designed to insulate the government 
against financial liability for the performance of discretionary 
functions such as "the selection of the appropriate design for 
military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces."  Id. at 511-
12, 108 S.Ct. at 2518 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)).   
 
 
 The Boyle court limited the scope of the displacement 
of state laws holding government contractors liable for design 
defects to the following circumstances: "(1) the United States 
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment 
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned 
the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment 
that were known to the supplier but not to the United States."  
Id. at 512, 108 S.Ct. at 2518.  However, the court indicated that 
"[i]n some cases, . . . where the federal interest requires a 
uniform rule, the entire body of state law applicable to the area 
conflicts and is replaced by federal rules."  Id. at 508, 108 
S.Ct. at 2516 (citations omitted). 
 Based on the two-part test applied in Boyle, the court 
in Caudill held that federal common law displaces state claims to 
recover benefits from a FEHBA plan.  Like Boyle, Caudill was not 
an action brought by or against the United States.  Nonetheless, 
the Caudill court made the following determination: 
 [t]he interest in this case is uniquely 
federal because it involves health benefits 
for federal employees. . . [and because the] 
imposition of state law liability here would 
seriously damage not only the government's 
ability to enter into contracts with health 
insurers, but also would affect the price 
paid for such contracts.  Most importantly, 
the federal government is a party to this 
contract.  Thus, a significant federal 
interest exists here that is even stronger 
than in Boyle. 
Caudill, 999 F.2d at 78.  The court also concluded that the 
application of state law to the construction of a contract under 
FEHBA would present a "significant conflict" with the federal 
 
 
interest in uniformity evidenced by FEHBA's preemption provision 
and its provision authorizing OPM review of benefits decisions by 
insurers.  Id. at 78-79.  The court reasoned that 
 [a]s an employer, the federal government has 
an overwhelming interest in ensuring that all 
of its employees subject to a particular 
health insurance policy are treated equally 
regardless of the state in which they live, 
and the application of state law interferes 
with this interest. . . .  [Moreover,] the 
very application of state contract law would 
undermine the uniformity envisioned by 
Congress when it delegated the authority to 
interpret health benefit contracts to OPM. 
Id. at 79.  Thus, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle, 
the Caudill court concluded that removal of the case was proper 
because "[i]n the area of federal employee health benefits, 
federal common law entirely replaces state contract law."  Id.    
 Our decisions in Railway and Allstate require us to 
reject the Caudill court's holding that Boyle authorizes the 
removal of a state law contract claim to recover benefits from a 
FEHBA plan.  First, Boyle is distinguishable from this case 
because it did not involve the removal of "what purports to be a 
state law claim" from state court to federal court on the basis 
of federal question jurisdiction.  Railway, 858 F.2d at 942.  
Instead, Boyle involved a state law claim initiated in federal 
district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  Boyle, 
487 U.S. at 502, 108 S.Ct. at 2513.  Thus, Boyle merely deals 
with a federal defense to a state claim and is therefore a 
preemption rather than a complete preemption case. 
 
 
 Second, in Railway and Allstate, we held that: (1) in a 
case removed from state court, a federal court may not 
recharacterize "what purports to be a state law claim as a claim 
arising under a federal statute" unless the state claim is 
completely preempted by federal law, Railway, 858 F.2d at 942, 
and that (2) a state claim is not preempted completely by federal 
law unless "the enforcement provisions of a federal statute 
create a federal cause of action vindicating the same interest 
that the plaintiff's cause of action seeks to vindicate,"  
Allstate, 879 F.2d at 93.  Thus, although the Supreme Court has 
stated that "the touchstone of the federal district court's 
removal jurisdiction is not the 'obviousness' of the pre-emption 
defense but the intent of Congress,"  Metropolitan, 481 U.S. at 
66, 107 S.Ct. 1548, we have held that Congress must manifest its 
intent to authorize the removal of a state claim by enacting a 
federal statute containing an enforcement provision vindicating 
the same interest as the state claim.12  Accordingly, we do not 
                     
12.  Our holding that a state claim is not preempted completely 
by federal law unless the enforcement provisions of a federal 
statute create a federal cause of action vindicating the same 
interest that the plaintiff's state cause of action seeks to 
vindicate is at odds with the holding in Deford v. Soo Line R. 
Co., 867 F.2d 1080, 1086 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927, 
109 S.Ct. 3265 (1989).  The court in Deford explicitly rejected 
our holding in Railway that because the Railway Labor Act lacked 
a civil enforcement provision under which the plaintiff could 
bring its state law claim, the Railway Labor Act did not preempt 
completely the plaintiff's state law claim.  The Deford court 
stated that while our approach in Railway "sheds some light on 
whether a federal statute 'pervasively occupies' a field of law, 
it is unnecessarily narrow," as a court must look not only to 
"affirmative congressional intent and civil enforcement 
provisions, but . . . [also] to such factors as the history and 
purpose of the statute."  Deford, 867 F.2d at 1086. 
 
 
view the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle as an expansion of the 
complete preemption doctrine, and we reject the Caudill court's 
construction of Boyle as a case establishing an alternative basis 
for the removal of a state claim to federal court. 
 Our outcome is consistent with that reached in Howard 
v. Group Hosp. Serv., 739 F.2d 1508, 1510-12 (10th Cir. 1984), in 
which the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the 
removal of an insured's state law tort and contract claims to 
recover benefits under a FEHBA plan was improper.  However, 
unlike our decision, the decision in Howard did not rest on the 
lack of a federal statutory cause of action vindicating the same 
interests as the insured's state causes of action.  In fact, the 
court in Howard made no reference to the complete preemption 
doctrine.   
 Instead, the Howard court based its decision on its 
conclusion that the federal government had no "articulable 
interest in the outcome," Howard, 739 F.2d at 1510, of what it 
characterized as a "private controversy" between an insured and a 
carrier, id. at 1512.  The court "fail[ed] to see how various 
state court adjudications of [FEHBA] . . . benefits claims . . . 
[would] frustrate the operation of that program or conflict with 
a specific national policy," and determined that "[s]tate court 
awards of monetary judgments in . . . [FEHBA] benefits actions do 
not have a sufficiently direct effect on the federal treasury to 
necessitate federal jurisdiction."  Id. at 1511.  On these 
grounds, the court concluded that state law, not federal law, 
controls actions to recover benefits under a FEHBA plan.  Id. at 
 
 
1510-12.  Cf. Howard v. Group Hospital Service, 739 F.2d at 1513 
(10th Cir. 1984) (concurring opinion) ("The majority opinion 
correctly concludes that no federal question jurisdiction is 
present in this case.  However, the conclusion is reached after a 
lengthy and unnecessary discussion of whether federal law should 
apply to the interpretation of the insurance policy.  Even if it 
were true that federal law should control the interpretation of 
the contract, that fact alone would be insufficient to establish 
a federal question giving rise to federal jurisdiction over the 
case. . . .  Because the arguable federal question appears in 
this case by way of a defense to simple state law contract 
claims, there is no basis for the exercise of federal question 
removal jurisdiction."). 
 We need not reach the question of whether the Goepels' 
state law claims are preempted by FEHBA, and thus are governed by 
federal common law.  The courts are divided on the extent to 
which FEHBA preempts state law.  As we noted, the court in Howard 
held that FEHBA does not preempt state law claims to recover 
benefits under a FEHBA plan.  Nevertheless, "'[t]he weight of 
authority . . . supports the position that state law claims are 
preempted,'" Burkey v. Government Employees Hosp. Ass'n, 983 F.2d 
656, 659 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that FEHBA preempts the 
application of Louisiana statute authorizing the imposition of 
penalties on plaintiff's insurer) (quoting Federal Plaza Medical 
Assocs. v. Palermino, 1991 WL 29201 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).  See, e.g., 
Caudill, 999 F.2d at 79 (holding that "[i]n the area of federal 
employee health benefits, federal common law entirely replaces 
 
 
state contract law"); Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 
F.2d 804, 806 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[t]o ensure uniformity in the 
administration of benefits under the Act (and thus control 
costs), section 8902(m)(1) mandates that once the OPM enters into 
a benefits contract, that contract has the preemptive force of 
federal law") (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1)); Harris v. Mutual of 
Omaha Companies, 992 F.2d 706, 711-12 n.1 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that federal common law of contracts governs the 
interpretation of government health insurance contracts) 
(citation omitted); Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 819 F.2d 921, 
926 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that FEHBA preempts all state law 
claims relating to a FEHBA plan), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1060, 
108 S.Ct. 1014 (1988); Tackitt v. Prudential Ins. Co,, 758 F.2d 
1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) ("the interpretation of government 
health insurance contracts is controlled by federal, not state, 
law"); Fink v. Delaware Valley HMO, 612 A.2d 485, 492-93 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that state tort claims brought by 
federal employee against HMO were preempted by FEHBA).13  But see 
Howard v. Group Hosp. Serv., 739 F.2d at 1512 (holding that 
removal of state law claims to recover benefits under a FEHBA 
                     
13.  With the exception of Caudill, none of these federal cases 
holding that FEHBA preempts state law claims for benefits deals 
expressly with the question of whether in the absence of 
diversity jurisdiction, FEHBA authorizes the removal of claims 
grounded exclusively on state law.  It seems that Nesseim, 
Harris, Burkey, and Tackitt involved actions initiated in federal 
district court.  The action in Hayes was initiated in state court 
and then removed to federal district court, Hayes, 819 F.2d at 




plan was improper, as state law, not federal law governed the 
claims); Mooney v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 678 F. 
Supp. 565, 566-67 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (following Howard, and holding 
that removal of state law claims to recover benefits under FEHBA 
plan was improper as "[t]here are no 'preempting' provisions in . 
. . [FEHBA], and absent an explicit instruction, we do not 
believe Congress intended the federal courts to fashion a federal 
common law of contracts to govern private disputes between plan 
participants and providers"); Eidler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield 
United of Wisconsin, 671 F. Supp. 1213, 1216-17 (E.D. Wis. 1987) 
(holding that insured's state law tort claim for bad faith was 
not preempted by FEHBA, as it was "not clear that the tort [wa]s 
inconsistent with any specific contractual provision").   
 The Plan is free to raise preemption as a defense in 
state court, and our holding that FEHBA does not completely 
preempt the Goepels' state law claims so as to permit removal of 
this action does not prejudge the merits of such a claim.  "State 
courts are competent to determine whether state law has been 
preempted by federal law," Railway, 858 F.2d at 942, and absent 
complete preemption, "they must be permitted to perform that 
function" with regard to state law claims brought before them, 
id.  Thus, based on our conclusion that the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over this case, we will reverse the 
order of September 10, 1993, denying the motion to remand, will 
vacate the order of September 24, 1993, entering judgment for the 
Plan on the merits, and will remand the matter to the district 
 
 
court so that it may remand the case to the Superior Court of New 
Jersey.   
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Stapleton, J., Concurring: 
 I agree with all that is said in the opinion of the 
court.  I write separately only to emphasize the importance, in 
my view, of the distinction noted by the court in footnote 7.  
Unlike the preemption provision of ERISA, the FEHBA preempts 
state law only "to the extent such law . . . is inconsistent with 
[a] contractual provision" of a FEHBA policy.  5 U.S.C.  
§ 8902(m)(1).  I believe the fact that Congress chose to so limit 
the preemptive effect of the FEHBA is inconsistent with the 
notion that Congress intended to "completely" preempt state law. 
 
